'Peasants' in East Pakistan in the Midst of Heightened Bengali Nationalism: An Argument against the Dominant Discourse

Neshat Quaiser

[Preliminary Remarks: This essay deals with the agrarian collective action in the East Pakistan/Bangladesh during the period between 1958 and 1971 which witnessed the heightened 'Bengali Nationalism' against what was described as the multiple exploitation and domination of the region by the West Pakistani ruling elite. The essay draws on author's doctoral dissertation.

Politically, the region that constituted East Pakistan/Bangladesh had a distinct character, as it was not the Indian National Congress but the Krishak Praja Party and the Muslim League, which set the terms for politico-ideological discourse. The author has called this region as the 'peripheral Muslim Bengal'. Historically, with the defeat of the Sirajuddaulah, the then Nawab of Bengal in 1756 and the acquisition of Diwani Rights in 1765 by the British, the Muslim landed and bureaucratic elites lost political power that heralded a new chapter in the history of Bengal. However, it was the introduction of the Permanent Settle­ment Act of 1793 that changed the whole complexion of the Indian sub-continental history paving the way for British rule. The Permanent Settlement Act created a class of new Zaminrdars (mostly Hindus) in place of old Muslim Zamindars and aristocrats. Permanent Settlement produced such conditions with far reaching implications changing social, economic, political and cultural complexion of the Indian sub-continent.[1] Since mid-18th century, the Indian sub-continent wit­nessed various forms and intensity the British political and administrative control culminating in formal British imperial rule in 1857 that continued till 1947 when British transferred political power to Indians with partition of India into two independent countries India and Pakistan. In 1971 Eastern part of Pakistan became an independent country-Bangladesh.

It is important to note that the Pakistan central governments kept changing in quick succession in whole of 1950s and political and constitutional crisis persisted leading to the imposition of Martial Law in the whole of Pakistan on 7th October 1958, and on the 27th October 1958 Ayub Khan, the Army Chief, became the President. Al1 power went to the hands of the military.]

In the region that constituted East Pakistan/Bangladesh, the land system before the advent of the British involved three interested parties -the cultivators, the Zamindars (revenue collecting agents) and the state or the political authority having the power to coerce and impose its will on others whether it be the individual or the semi-independent feudal authority. The Floud Commission of 1940, officially known as the Bengal Land Revenue Commission, noted that by the time of the Mughal conquest the old state right or zamindari had been magnified into a general superior ownership of the entire domain [2]. Superior ownership led to the reinforcement of the notion of superiority of the owners/nobles/chiefs etc and reinforcement of the superior caste/ class/race ideology.

With the partition of the sub­continent and the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the Hindu zamindars and Hindu big landlords who concentrated in East Bengal, began to migrate to India. So, the Zamindari Abolition Act was enacted by the then East Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1950 without much difficulty. The Act of 1950 was considered by many to be a major land reform. This Act sought to abolish the Permanent Settlement Act by implementing direct payment of land revenue by the actual owners and tillers of the soil and eliminating all intermediary rent receiving interests.

However, Umar [3] notes: This Act did not really benefit the peasant because (a) the distributed land that went to each peasant was very small in size and sharecropping continued, (b) the zamindar was now replaced by the repressive state which collected as much tax and sent its officials to harass the peasants, (c) the system became more mechanised, (d) corruption in the form of bribes etc set in the rural areas and (e) money lending continued because of the continu­ing impoverishment (also see: Jehangir: 1982: and Joshi 1972: 66-67 and 69-70)[4].

'Peasant' Resistance: 1948-1951
In the 1946 general elections, the Muslim League won the majority of the seats (i.e., 113 out of 119) in Bengal. In this election, the Communist Party of India (CPI) contested 13 seats from Bengal: 7 from West Bengal and 6 from East Bengal. After the War and general elections, the CPI decided to launch a vigorous anti-British movement. Towards the end of 1946, the provincial leadership of Krishak Samiti gave a call to the peasants to launch a move­ment against the half share (Adhi Barga) resulting in Tebhaga movement where peasants demanded that (a) the sharecropper get 2/3 of the produce and the landowner 1/3, (b) the land right of the sharecrop­pers be recognised; against Tonko systems under which the peasant was obliged to give a fixed amount of paddy to the landlord irrespective of the pro­duce; and against the Nankar system under which peasants of Sylhet district were allotted a dwarf plot each to feed their families. In return, they had to perform unpaid services on the landlord's private land.

However, owing to the rise of Bengali Nationalism in the wake of Bhasha Andolan of 1948-1952; all-pervasive Bengali nationalist opposition to the economic and political exploitation and domination concealing internal class-caste divisions; Hindu-Muslim clashes even in villages after the partition; suppression of Krishak Samiti by the Muslim League government; migra­tion of almost all the Hindu communist peasant leaders and activists to India; the landed gentry made use of caste connections to influence the villagers, as a result, most of the Muslim peasants abandoned the move-ment [5]; and later imposition of Martial law, the first phase of peasant uprisings of 1948-51 were significantly diminished and were no more visible.

As a result, after the first phase of peasant uprisings of 1948-51, the period between 1951 - 71 was a period of 'na­tional' struggle. During this pe­riod peasants were mobilised largely as part of autonomy struggle and later national liberation struggle, i.e., against the external enemy (West Pakistan ruling elites) and not solely for their own demands, i.e., against the internal enemy (the local internal agrarian exploiters and oppressors). There were no peas­ant 'movement' in the strict sense of the term though, it may be argued, that contrary to the popular view, language/au­tonomy/national movements were not completely devoid of peasant question, as the anti-feudal struggle was the primary motive force for peasants' par­ticipation in these movements.

Peasants in the midst of heightened nationalism-1958-1971
The period between 1958 and 1971 was marked by three sig­nificant features: (a) introduc­tion of the system of Basic Democracy to create an organised social base for the state's sustenance in the face of growing agrarian unrest and the challenges thrown by the rising Bengali bourgeoisie and middle classes against the central ruling elites of West Pakistan who practised the politics of discrimination against East Pakistan; (b) communists remained dormant as far as the anti-feudal struggle was concerned; and (c) the rise of 'Bengali nationalism' (which was initially articulated by the Bhasha Andolan (Language movement) of 1952) and the emergence of the Awami League as the principal negotiator.

However, of these three, Bengali nationalism was the single most important feature that dominated almost whole of the visible social and political space particularly since 1966. This all-encompassing Bengali Nationalism emerged as the argument of the day, the dominant discourse. Everything else seemed to have had been rendered invisible or assigned a peripheral role particularly the anti-feudal agrarian resistance.

However, this was not the reality. In the following what is presented is the active 'peasant' (predominantly the immediate producer), who carried out the struggles against agrarian rela­tions of domination, directed against landlords, money lenders, feudal values of oppression and the state, in the face of all pervasive nationalism. The peasants treated the feudal oppression and exploitation in much the same fashion as the 'nationalism' of yester years had treated this question during the colonial period. The peasant was not against nationalism, but he knew well the meaning of this nation­alism. Incidents and happenings taking place far away from the centre and which were rendered small and insignificant in the face of all-encompassing nation­alistic wave, have become constitutive elements in the con­struction of what follows.

Bhashani -the red maulana and the Awami League: political contours and the agrarian question
In East Pakistan the Awami League founded in 1949 was struggling hard to occupy all the available political spaces and emerge as sole negotiator with West Pakistan ruling elite. However, there were other significant players too such as The National Awami Party (NAP). The National Awami Party (NAP Bhashani), led by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani-the Red Maulana-and the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman, were distinct political entities in East Pakistan with differing ideologies and approaches to politics. The Awami League, while also advocating for Bengali nationalism and autonomy, was more moderate and focused on parliamen­tary politics, while Bhashani's NAP was more radical and emphasised mass mobilisation and socialist ideals.

Bhashani and communists left the Awami League Council and on 25th July 1957, and the Na­tional Awami Party (NAP) was formed under the leadership of Bhashani. NAP advocated the line of two self-governed units in Pakistan under a federal structure, and opposed any cultural domination. The seizing of zamindari without compensation; distribution of excess land to peasants particularly to landless and poor peasants; reform of sharecropping system; to waive peasants' loans were points in its 56-point Programme. The Programme also included the demands such as rehabilitation of zamindars, Talukdars, and others whose property have been seized; remunerative price for jute, sugar cane, tobacco and other cash crops [6].

With the formation of the NAP, Bhashani formed a Krishak Samiti also in 1957 and the communists decided to work in it. Badruddin Umar, a communist leader and author, observed: "that till the mid-sixties, peasant movements were not organised significantly, however, there were sporadic movements against landlords. When after the elections under the system of Basic Democracy the Martial Law was lifted in 1962, the Krishak Samiti held its conference at Raipura. The Raipura conference was mobilised on the issue of corruption in government, in other words not the class line, but the community line was privileged, i.e., the Krishak Samiti spoke for all peasants. It was obvious because the Krishak Samiti no longer remained a class organisation though the communists worked in it (personal communication-1987).

In 1960s, the Krishak Samiti under the NAP was the only national peasant organisation with Communist Party activists in it. However, in 1967 NAP split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions, and pro-Peking commu­nists remained with Bhashani. Pro-Peking leftists maintained their importance in it but it was never well organised though there was a general influence in villages and Bhashani's personal popularity had an effect [7]. Bhashani talked of worsening condition of peasants at all levels. According to him, Ayub government is the representative of the US aided big bourgeoisie and feudal classes [8]. Bhashani converted the Awami League led urban based 1968 anti-Ayub movement into a political move­ment of rural poor [9]. Bhashani realised that unless you eliminate the Jotedars, Mahajans and their touts in the rural areas, the peasants cannot be liberated. Bhashani's Gheralo Andolan continued in 1969 facing state repression including deaths in police firing.

Meanwhile, a Democratic Action Committee (DAC) was formed with eight parties for federal character, parliamentary government, lifting of emergency, universal voting right, release of political prisoners etcIt included Awami League, Pro-Moscow NAP (Wali) and Jamiat-ulemai-Islam. Bhashani put the condition that unless demands for abolishing feudalism, capitalism and imperialism are included in DAC programme, the NAP will not join it. Along with students' movement Bhashani's 'Jalao Porao-Gherao' (set on fire-burn-encircle) movement continued.

In March 1969 Ayub Khan called a Round Table Confer­ence (RTC) which was held at Rawalpindi between Ayub and DAC leaders to solve political crisis. Bhashani boycotted the Conference and asked others also to do so. But in spite of opposition from Bhashani Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman of Awami League attended RTC. RTC could achieve only the right for universal voting and federal par­liamentary government. Accord­ing to Bhashani, RTC was hopelessly inadequate to promote the interests of working class and peasantry. NAP (Bhashani) had put eight more conditions for attending RTC in addition to eleven points of Student Action Committee (SAC) of East Paki­stan Students Union (EPSU). SAC demands included exemption of taxes for those who owned up to five acres of land in East Pakistan and 12 acres in West Pakistan, peasants' due tax be written off, recovery of loans from peasants be postponed etc. East Pakistan Students League (EPSL) threatened to stop paying taxes if eleven-point programme was not accepted.

On 28th February 1969, Krishak Samiti organised a public meeting in Chiwara of Comilla district. Bhashani declared his resolve to take the movement for eleven-point programme to every village and every hamlet. He declared that RTCs are meant for compro­mises, which benefit the rulers that is why instead of going to Rawalpindi I am going to remote corners of rural Bengal to become a part of the combined peasants workers movement [10].

On 24th March 1969 Ayub invited General Yahya Khan to protect the country from immi­nent split. On 25th March 1969, Yahya declared Martial Law. Constitution and national and provincia1 assemblies were dissolved. And the same month the Bangladesh Liberation movement intensified culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country in December 1971.

'Heightened nationalism' and the parallel stream of peasant resistance
Contrary to the popular view, peasants at various levels had been stirred and mobilised into the Nationalist movement including in anti-Ayub movement of 1968-'69. Although it was a part of Nationalist movement of various ideological shades, and the peasants were not in the leadership at all levels and although the movement was not for the specific demands of the peasants alone, the large-scale participation of peasantry in the movement, which finally led to the second national liberation movement in March 1969, was a definite indicator in the peasant politics of East Pakistan. Thus, it is evident that there was a parallel stream with peasants and peasant question in the centre. Nationalism was perceived by the peasant from this perspective. It was a two-pronged struggle, i.e., against the external enemy as well as against the internal enemy. However, the anti-feuda1 struggle was not always visible, as has been noted earlier. Peasants participated in these movements once again with certain hope as they had done in 1946-'47 and again during 1948-'50.

And they seized spontaneity
Spontaneous necessarily is not unorganised. Acting spontane­ously does not necessarily mean acting on unphilosophical impulses. Spontaneously also means seizing spontaneity. Both individuals and organisations can act spontaneously. Spontaneous acts, especially in the present context, means cumulative expression of accumulated experiences in this case of the relations of domination. It becomes a spontaneous response to a call. Establishing a dialogue system of this type becomes a necessity.

Hence, parallel to organised collective response of peasants in the form of Jagatpur struggle, one finds independent spontaneous rebellion of peasants during this Period. During 1968-'69 (December-March) there were widespread mass movements in East Pakistan. Actually the spontaneous killing of Jotedars, Mahajans and Union Council Chairmen and members had started since 1966. But these killings "were not a part of any organisation" (Umar, 1985: 19-20). The 1968-'69 movement against Ayub regime was yet another instance of the rebellious character of the Bengali Muslim peasantry. There was practically no official government. The people organised themselves into committees and performed summary justice. They burnt the cattle lifters and other criminals alive, killed the local oppressors in broad daylight, with great relish looted, fined or otherwise chastised Ayub Khan's Basic Democrats-the new vested inter­est created by the great Khan on the analogy of Lord Cornwallis' zamindars to work as the social base of his regime [11]. During this period the incidents of annihilation increased in certain areas such as Chandpur, Jamalpur, Tangail, Manikganj etc. This had created panic [12].

Detailed accounts of these spontaneous movements are not adequately recorded. Here are some parts of a novel written in the background of 1968-'69 anti-Ayub movement. This account brings sharply the peasant responses to the events and situation prevailing at that time with respect to the anti-Ayub movement, but more importantly class relations in rural Bangladesh and peasant response to the exploitative and oppressive structures there even in the height of 'national, upsurge. These autonomous peasant mobilisations outside the formal structure of many peasant organisations speak a lot and constitute an important part of peasant collective action. Though these movements cannot totally be divested of larger peasant mobilisation, they establish their autonomy in a specific sense. Accounts of Spontaneous peasant resistance by the Bhashani's Krishak Samiti during this period have been portrayed by the celebrated Bengali novelist Akhtaruzzaman Ilyas in his well-known novel Chilakotai Sipai,[13] where the Goru Chori (Cattle lifting) phenomenon prominently figured, and assumed greater symbolic significance revealing the dynamics of domination and dissent.

In Akhtaruzzaman Ilyas' account 'Party' and Anwar (Party cadre) have figured time and again. But their role has been marginal.

Similarly, during this period spontaneous movement against Goru Chors (cow lifters) once again gathered momentum. Peasants caught hold of cattle lifters and burnt them alive. According to Umar, the peasant movements got momentum since 1967. However, according to him many of the post-1967 peasant movements were spontaneous. For example, the 'Goru Chor movement' (movement against the cattle lifters). Landlords with the help of their musclemen stole cows of peasants and kept them on the pretext that the cows have damaged their crops. So in order to get back the cows, the peasants were forced to pay money to landlords. Against this 'Goru Chori', Umar said, peas­ants spontaneously got organised and started killing landlords indicating that the peasants could take independent actions which show their organisability and that even in the height of nationalist movement, peasants could display their class consciousness and unexpected collective actions [14].

Umar (1985: 20) observed that in the 1968-'69 anti-Ayub movement, the Krishak Samiti had no significant role to play [15]. Shamsuddin observed: "The 1968-'69 movement was a revolt and only due to absence of organised leadership it failed to become a revolution" [16]. Thus, seizing the spontaneity became a metaphor for human celebration.

The experience of Jagatpur
The struggle of the peasants of Jagatpur during the anti-Ayub movement was an example of overt expression of the unexpected collective action and that a parallel anti-feudal stream existed in the midst of heightened nationalism.

The village Jagatpur is in the Narail subdivision of Jessore district, which had a long history of peasant uprisings and protests. In 1963, emboldened by the countrywide demonstrations-Gherao and Jalao (to encircle and to set fire to)-the peasants of Jagatpur once again de­manded a better deal from the owners of the land they cultivated. When negotiations failed, they (15 Muslims and 10 Hin­dus) collectively refused to carry the landowners' share of the produce from the field to the latter's house. But with the spontaneous participation of peasants and workers the anti-Ayub movement not only spread all over the country, but also radical demands and militant forms of struggle started to surface [17] (Siddiqui, 1987: 363-4). This obviously frightened the rising Bengali rural and urban propertied classes. They were in the movement only to obtain the maximum concessions for themselves from the Pakistan ruling class and soon came to an understanding with the establishment. Since the left was in disarray it could not shape the discontent of the rural masses into revolutionary channels, so the 1968's promise for the countryside was brief and receded into the background with the clamping down of Martial Law for the second time -March 1969 [18]. Thus, the sharecroppers in Jagatpur failed to take off. The landowners in their turn retaliated by employing sharecroppers from the neighbouring villages and withdrawing land from the defiant ones. As a result they were forced to compromise with the landlords. In the words of one of the landowners, "we had to retaliate in order to teach them a proper lesson". The left dominated peasant mobilisation in the meantime oriented towards an extreme line, which included among others withdrawal from mass political actions in favour of physical elimination of perceived class enemies. But there were serious gaps in perception between party workers and masses and the party methods were often not appreciated. In 1971, the retreat of the Awami League cadres to India and the movement of Pakistan armies to the cities the leftists obtained the strongest ever position in the village in 1971. With the return of the Muktibahini, however, the leftists were subjected to systematic repression and lost their dominance in the villages [19]. Though peasants ostensibly failed, in essence the struggle was a celebration of peasants' class consciousness. It did con­firm the existence of an ideology of possibilities.

The Radicals, The Maulana, Religion And the Peasants
Bhahani's role in peasant resistance also indicated his view that religion could be employed as a force to mobilise peasants for anti-feudal struggles. The anti-Ayub movement led by Bhashani and the Krishak Samiti with the active participation of the Marxist-Leninists, assumed greater importance as until 1967, the Communist Party did not take any step to raise class conscious­ness among peasants. The East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP) had a "policy to give preference to build citizens' movement" [20]. The EPCP (ML), which was founded in 1967 after a split in the Communist Party of East Pakistan, had tried to reorganise the peasant movement, though it was not very successful, Maulana Bhashani was as vocal about the peasants' rights and problems but did not have the perception to organise peasants towards class struggle. The people who worked with Bhashani came from small, middle or large Jotedar back-ground [21]. The EPCP split further and in 1968, Purbo Bangla Communist Party (PBCP) was formed and Bhashani took up a "clear cut programme against Ayub". His 'Jalao-Gherao' movement has to be seen against this background. A Lal Tupi (Red Cap) Bahini (Peasant Volunteer) was formed by the PBCP. The first conference of the Bahini was held in Shahpur where one-lakh peasant volunteers came wearing red caps, and holding sticks. Two more conferences were held in Mahipur and Santosh [22]. However, according to a then Marxist student leader: "when the Martial Law was imposed and any mobilisation of the peasants was almost impossible, it was Bhashani who organised peasant volunteers called Lal Tupi Bahini and ap­pealed the peasants to join the anti-Yahya movement. He used religious symbols to mobilise Muslim peasants. Bhashani gave directives that each and every peasant should carry a stick as high as it should reach the level of one's ear, as the Prophet also carried a similar stick. He called it "SunnatiLaathi" (Stick or a staff in the tradition of Prophet Muhammad). The first confer­ence of the Lal Tupi Bahini was held in Shahpur in Pabna district in 1969 successfully in spite of Martial Law" [23].

The Shahpur Conference gave the Krishak Samiti a new mili­tant character but by then the communists had ideologically divided. Allauddin Ahmed the then organising secretary of the Krishak Samiti and secretary of reception committee of the Conference, in his report called 'Mukti Dak' stated:

"Shapur Sammelan (Conference) will occupy a prominent place in the history of peasants' liberation struggle as well as in the national liberation struggle. The militant character of peasants had got subdued since the conspiracy of election oriented vested interest clique since 1954. This Conference has brought out the lost militancy. Pro-Government reactionary political parties, Jotedar-Mahajan, mill owners and fake progressives, all of them made an all-out effort to sabotage it. Thousands of peasants congratulated the Maulana for organising this Conference. Maulana toured North Bengal and went to Taingail to hold Urs [24] and activists' meeting. Efforts were made by the 'the pro-worker-peasant leaders' and the government to stop the Conference. In a month's time a few thousand meetings of activists were held all over the province and 1.5 lakh propa­ganda leaflets were distributed. After the imposition of Martial Law the parliamentary politicians were lying low but the peasant leaders had kept up their work" [25].

In continuation of his view of employing religion to mobilise peasants, towards June 1969, Bhashani talked on Islamic Cultural Revolution in the specific contexts of East Bengal. His communist associates felt uncomfortable and some of them openly criticised him [26]. Bhashani demanded reservation of seats in Assembly for peasants and workers in the coming general elections.

Meanwhile serious differences emerged within the pro-Peking NAP (B) after the imposition of Martial Law in March 1969 mainly over the question of participation in the ensuing first general elections in December 1970. The faction led by Abdul Matin opposed the participation in the election and advocated armed revolution. However, in a meeting of the Krishak Samiti held in Dhaka on 5-6 October 1969, Bhashani, the President, and the pro Peking communist leader Md Toha, the Secretary of the NAP(B) rejected this view. But after a peasant rally held at Santosh in January 1970, Toha reversed his earlier position by rejecting bourgeois democracy. He criticised Bhashani's concept of "Islamic Socialism" and "Islamic Cultural Revolution". The pro-election faction of the NAP(B) remained with Bhashani. However, in December 1970 general elections, the NAP(B) suffered serious setback.

With Yahya in power, Bhashani and the Muslim League drifted apart and the Muslim League established contacts with the Communist Party of India [Marxist Leninist] (CPI-ML) and EPCP (ML) accepted annihilation as the only character of guerrilla warfare. So in mid-1970s the politics of annihi­lation gradually expanded and by 1971 not only the EPCP (ML) but also all the other pro-Peking groups started practising the annihilation line. As a result, all the mass organisations such as Krishak Samiti, Shramik Federation, student union etcwere abandoned and, directly under the party, peasants and workers were organised as Charu Mazumdar had advocated [27]. On the other hand, Bhashani in the same period was also organising the peasants on an altogether different pattern.

When the open revolt against West Pakistan started in March 1971, the EPCP (ML) came out with the thesis that the conflict between Yahya Khan and Bhutto on the one hand, and Mujeeb and his lieutenants on the other, was a struggle between the two bootlicking dogs of the American imperialists to protect monopoly comprador capitalists, landlords and Jagirdars of West Pakistan, while Mujeeb represented rising Bengali classes and wanted to gain supremacy simi­larly under US protection. Thus, the Party gave a call for liberation war against both the Pakistan army and the Awami League cadres.

With the new onslaught by Yahya, the army spread to the whole of rural area and started indiscriminate killing, loot, rape etc. Against this, the EPCP (ML) and other Marxist Leninist groups got organised which brought to them the active support of rural poor in the districts of Jessore, Khulna, Kushtia, Pabna, Rajshahi, Noakhali etc.[28]

Mohd. Toha, the EPCP (ML) leader had collected about 10,000 red guerrillas in Ranagati of Noakhali district [29]. In order to fight the counter-revolutionary forces of both the Awami League and Pakistan they killed land holders and money lenders. But this could not continue for long as China came in support of Yahya Khan in the name of protecting national sovereignty of Pakistan creating a great deal of confusion. Since March 1969, anti-Pakistan movement led by the Awami League had been continuously gaining momentum and by 1970-'71, this movement had wholly become a national liberation movement. It was not possible for Marxist-Leninists to keep themselves aloof from the national movement and involve only in anti-feudal struggles. Thus, the new line to fight both the Awami League and Pakistan. Since April 1971, Marxist-Leninists started "a three pronged attacks against (a) Pakistan army, (b) Muktibahini and (c) Jotedar, Mahajans etc.[30] as Muktibahini and the Awami League were seen, as puppets in the hands of Indian expansionists and acting at the behest of the Soviet social imperialism. At the same time Pakistan army also was to be fought out as it perpetrated repression on masses and represented the repressive state apparatuses of Pakistan government. Several armed clashes took place between Naxalites (as Marxist Leninists in East Pakistan came to be known) and Muktibahini. However, in the process, the movement against Pakistani forces lost its edge and "when the peasants saw communists fighting Muktibahini and annihilated even small Jotedars, they started withdrawing their support. This helped the Awami League a lot, which had feared that leadership might go into the hands of communists [31].

However, communists in 1971 were able to distribute some land of Jotedars to poor and landless peasants in Jessore, Khulna, Kushtia etc. However, peasants could not retain this land for long. They killed thousands of what they claimed class enemies. The number of annihilation itself shows what types of landowners were killed, although 5-6 big landowners were also killed. People went against them [32]. However, Umar's view suffers from serious theoretical astigmatism. He does not go into the underlying causal factor. He locates the cause of such opposition to Marxist-Leninists by peas­ants in their desire for 'national' liberation struggle. It is true that peasants wanted national libera­tion but not for the same reasons as of its leaders, but liberation as hope, as possibility to get their conditions mitigated. Hence, 'op­position' or 'support' in such a situation acquire a specific metaphorical connotation.

However, the activities of vari­ous Marxist-Leninist groups "created the impression in India and abroad that the Bangladesh liberation war would ultimately lead to the emergence of radical leadership in Bangladesh" [33]. However, this was not to happen, as the events suggest. But the indirect influence of the communist revolutionaries was substantial.

The Awami League and Mujeeb feared that the Mukti Bahini guerrillas might join the leftists, thus they indulged in revolutionary phrase mongering by marshalling words such as 'nationalism', 'democracy', 'social­ism' as the guiding principles of the new state of Bangladesh.

References:

1. The Permanent Settlement or Zamindari System was formally brought to an end in 1951 by the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950.
2. Government of Bengal- Report of the Land Revenue Commission Bengal. Vol. II. Appendices (I to IX) AND Indian Land-System Ancient, Mediaeval and Modem. Superintendent, Government Printing. Bengal Government Press, Alipore, Bengal. 1940.
3. Umar, Badruddin. 1985: Bangladesher Krishak O Krishak Andolan. Progoti Prokashini, Dhaka. Pp. 39-40
4. See also: Jehangir. B.K. 1982. Rural Siciety, Power Structure and Class Practice. Centre for Social Studies, Dhaka. P. 79; Joshi, P.C. 1972. 'Land Reforms-An Urgent Problem in Bangladesh' in V.K.R.V. Rao edited Bangladesh Economy-Problems and Prospects. Vikas Publications, Delhi. Pp. 66 67 and 69 70.
5. Gankovsky, Y.V. and Polonskaya, L.R. Gordon. 1964. A History of Pakistan. Nauka Publishing House, Moscow. P. 144
6. Maksood, Syed Abdul.1986. Bhashani: Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BhashanirJiban, Karmakandu, Rajniti O Darshan. Published by the author. P. 208.
7. Umar, 1985. Op.cit. pp. 19 20.
8. His speech in Ibid. pp. 247 74).
9. See Ibid. p. 278
10. See Ibid. pp. 289-90.
11. Shamsuddin, AbuJafar. 1983: Sociology of Bengal Politics and other Essays. Bangladesh Book International, Dhaka. P.27.
12. Umar. 1985. Op.cit. p.20.
13. Ilya, Akhtaruzzaman. 1986. Chilekothar Sepai. University Press Ltd. Dhaka. Pp. Passim. For details see Umar, 1985. Op.cit. pp. 19 20.
14. For details see Umar, 1985. Op.cit. pp. 19 20.
15. Ibid. p. 20.
16. Shamsuddin. Op.cit.
17. (Siddiqui, Kamal, 1987: The Political Economy of Rural Poverty in Bangladesh. Na¬tional Institute of Local Government. Dhaka. Pp.363-4
18. Ibid. p.365.
19. Ibid. p. 366.
20. Mahfuzullah, 1978. 'Bangladeshe Kriskak Andolan: Krishak Netader Sakkhatkar O Prayalochna', Bichitra (weekly), Vol. 5, No. 24. Deben Shikdar, a communist leader, to Mahfuzullah.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. As told to this author in a personal communication in 1987.
24. The death anniversary of a Sufi saint, usually held at the saint's dargaah (shrine or tomb).
25. Maksood, 1986. Op.cit. p. 294.
26. Ibid. p.295.
27. Mar, 1985. Op.cit. pp. 24 26.
28. Badruddin Umar in personal communication.
29. (Maniruzzaman, Talukdar. 1988: Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath. Universit, Press. Dhaka. P. 144)
30. Umar, 1985. Op.cit. p: 29.
31. Umar, 1985. Op.cit. pp. 29-30
32. Ibid. pp. 30-31
33. Maniruzzaman, 1988. Op.cit p.:144
34. Ibid. p. 151.

[Neshat Quaiser, Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH)]

Back to Home Page

Frontier Autumn Number
Vol 58, No. 14 - 17, Sep 28 - Oct 25, 2025